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Prevention or repression?












There is a marked contrast between the growing sense of insecu-
rity among the population and the absence of consolidated statis-
tics that would allow the phenomenon to be measured more
objectively. This article seeks to make a contribution to the
knowledge of the situation of citizen insecurity affecting the re-
gion, taking a comparative view based on the limited and not al-
ways reliable information available and looking at the problem
from various standpoints, both social and economic. The authors
begin by examining some manifestations of criminal violence in
the 1990s, especially in urban areas, after which they review the
most important theories on the study of violence, the profiles of
victims and attackers, traditional and emerging forms of delin-
quency, the frequent relation between violence and unemploy-
ment, the economic cost of violence and delinquency, and the
main policies adopted to deal with them. They then go on to ex-
amine the measures taken in the region with regard to citizen se-
curity, which have shown the need to use more integral forms of
prevention (primary and secondary) and control for dealing with
criminal violence and to consolidate the systems of crime statis-
tics of the region in order to be able to identify the factors with
the greatest incidence on criminal violence and the less visible
forms taken by the latter.
I
A diagnosis of citizen security
and violence in Latin America
1. The relations between delinquency and
violence. Concepts of citizen and public
security
In social science there are two basic theories on the
study of violence and criminal conduct, which are
used in various combinations: the theory of forms of
socialization and the theory of rupture or anomy. The
first of these emphasizes socialization, as it holds
that violence has organizational, institutional and
cultural dimensions which can lead to the selection
of violent strategies by certain social actors. Thus,
the theory put forward by Sutherland claims that the
primary causes of delinquency lie in the existence of
subcultural groups of criminals (friends, family,
prison acquaintances) which pass on criminal
know-how (ILPES, 1997).
The second theory places more emphasis on the
structural and social dimensions as explanatory fac-
tors: violence stems from the breakdown or malad-
justment of the social order, that is to say, from rapid
social changes due to industrialization and urbaniza-
tion which dissolve the traditional social control
mechanisms and generate a gap between aspirations
and the socially and culturally accepted means of
making them come true (Martínez, 1990). Thus, for
example, Malton’s theory holds that criminal con-
duct depends on the capacity of individuals to attain
their goals in line with their social environment and
the importance attached to economic success (ILPES,
1997). From this standpoint, then, there is an impor-
tant correlation between poverty and delinquency
and social exclusion.
Against a background of rapid changes in the
economic field and the appearance of new economic
needs, the deterioration in the quality of life of broad
sectors of the population and the failure to solve
long-standing problems (civil wars, inequality of in-
come distribution and access to land), delinquency
seems a self-defence mechanism for unlucky losers
(traditional forms of delinquency such as burglary,
theft or armed robbery) or as a new way of making
easy money through corruption or through new
methods such as laundering hot money, electronic
fraud, etc. (Moulian, 1997).
With regard to the definition of violence, there is
some degree of consensus that it should be under-
stood as the use or threat of physical or psychologi-
cal force with harmful intent on a recurrent basis and
as a way of settling conflicts (Guerrero, 1997;
McAlister, 1998; Tironi and Weinstein, 1990). Vio-
lence is related to aggressiveness but is more than
just an aggressive action, because it is recurrent and
forms part of a process; it may also be noted that
there are aggressive actions which are not violent.
Aggressiveness has a psychological basis in frustra-
tion, but in order for frustration to give rise to ag-
gressive actions it must be combined with other
elements: for example, obstacles to the attainment of
an anticipated objective, rage over arbitrary treat-
ment, or a habit of responding aggressively to prob-
lem situations (Tironi and Weinstein, 1990). In other
words, violence and related aspects such as aggres-
sion or frustration depend on a complex set of psy-
chological, social and cultural elements.
In defining citizen security, emphasis has been
placed on various dimensions and levels, especially
its intangible and subjective nature. Broadly, it may
be defined as concern for quality of life and human
dignity in terms of freedom, access to the market and
social opportunities. Poverty and lack of opportuni-
ties, unemployment, hunger, deterioration of the
environment, political repression, violence, delin-
quency and drug addiction can all be threats to citi-
zen security (ILPES, 1997, p. 5). From another
standpoint, it is held that citizen security mainly
means not living in fear of suffering a violent attack,
knowing that one’s physical integrity will be re-
spected, and, above all, being able to enjoy the pri-
vacy of one’s home without the fear of assault and
moving freely around the streets without the fear of
being robbed or attacked. Security would thus be a
cultural construct involving an equalitarian form of
sociability, an environment freely shared by all
(UNDP, 1998, p. 128).
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At a more limited level, public security has been
defined as the set of coherent and interlinked policies
and actions which serve to guarantee the public
peace by the prevention and repression of
delinquency and offences against public order
through a system of penal and administrative control
(González Ruiz, López and Núñez, 1994).
2. Factors associated with violence
The complexity of violence is reflected in the great
variety of different types and levels it displays. By its
nature, violence may be classified as physical, psy-
chological or sexual; by its victims, as violence
against children, women, or old people; by its mo-
tive, as political, racial, etc., and by its place of oc-
currence, as domestic, workplace, street violence,
etc. (Guerrero, 1998; Larraín, Vega and Delgado,
1997). Violence can also be defined according to the
effects it causes in its victims and may be
cross-referenced as personal or institutional and
physical or psychological violence.
In view of the nature of the phenomenon of vio-
lence, it is necessary to adopt a multi-causal ap-
proach –like the epidemiological approach used in
public health– in which the aim is not to establish the
cause of violence but to identify the factors that pro-
duce it or are most frequently associated with it
(Guerrero, 1998; PAHO, 1996) and those that usually
operate together, with emphasis on the work of pre-
vention. In this approach, the causality is always in-
terpreted as probability, so that the more factors of
risk are present at the same time, the greater the
probability that the phenomenon will occur
(Fedesarrollo, 1996).
The factors of risk may be classified in three
main groups:
i) factors related with the position and family
and social status of the persons in question: sex, age,
education, socialization in an atmosphere of vio-
lence, consumption of alcohol and drugs;
ii) social, economic and cultural factors: unem-
ployment, poverty, overcrowding, social inequality,
violence in the mass media, culture of violence, and
iii) contextual and institutional factors: war,
drug trafficking, corruption, availability of firearms,
parties and other festive occasions.
Quantitative information is available for some
Latin American countries on some of the social and
economic shortcomings usually associated with ur-
ban violence1 (table 1). The interaction of these
quantifiable factors of risk with others of a more
qualitative nature on which information is not avail-
able can give rise to a climate of violence. The fac-
tors set forth in the table should also undoubtedly be
related with others of a historical and cultural nature
in order to understand the phenomena of urban vio-
lence and the differences between one country and
another. Nevertheless, the quantification which has
been made of some social and economic factors does
indicate situations of risk that should be tackled with
effective public policies.
3. Poverty, delinquency and urban violence
The growth of urban poverty in the last decade is
usually seen as being associated with the increase in
violence, delinquency and insecurity in the cities. Vi-
olence and insecurity do not depend only on poverty,
however (box 1). Experience shows that, rather than
poverty, it is inequality –together with other social,
cultural and psychological factors– that generates
more violence. This allows us to gain a fuller under-
standing of the phenomenon of delinquency, in both
its traditional and emergent forms. Various studies
carried out in Peru and Colombia have found no rela-
tion between poverty and violence: the poorest re-
gions are not the most violent ones, nor is there a
correlation between poverty and the number of mur-
ders (Fedesarrollo, 1996; Reyna and Toche, 1999).
The existence of networks of mutual relations
and confidence in a community fosters much
smoother and less violent forms of interaction, even
in conditions of poverty. This “social capital”
(Putnam, 1993) can make the difference between a
poor community with low levels of violence and a
community with a similar level of poverty but higher
levels of violence. However, it has been pointed out
that there is also a “perverse” form of social capital
in which the networks, contacts and associations
serve illegal activities (Rubio, 1998a).
A fairly widespread interpretation on the genera-
tion of violence is that poverty generates frustration,
and this leads to radical or aggressive forms of con-
duct which, in turn, give rise to violent situations.
Taking this point of view, the idea is that the crises
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1 This information is taken from the Social Panorama of Latin
America, 1998 (ECLAC, 1999).
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TABLE 1
Latin America: Presence of urban violence risk factors, 1997
Quantifiable risk factors Countries with a high presence Countries with a medium Countries with a low presencepresence
1. Urban income inequality Ratio of over 11: Brazil, Ratio of 8 to 11: Argentina, Ratio of up to 8: Costa Rica,
(ratio of 10% richest to Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico
40% poorest) Panama Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Uruguay
and Venezuela
2. Poverty of urban households 40% or more of households: Between 20% and 39% of Less than 20% of households:
Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, households: Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay
Paraguay, Venezuela Peru, Dominican Republic
3. Rate of open urban Over 10%: Argentina, Between 6% and 10%: Brazil, Less than 6%: Bolivia, Mexico
unemployment Colombia, Panama, Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Venezuela Honduras, Paraguay, Peru
4. Percentage of urban young Over 15%: Honduras, Uruguay Between 8% and 15%: Less than 8%: Bolivia, Chile,
people between 13 and 17 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic
who neither study nor work Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Venezuela
5. Educational deficit Over 20%: Brazil, Honduras Between 10% and 20%: Less than 10%: Argentina,
(percentage of urban young Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, Uruguay
people aged 14 or 15 who Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
have not completed 6 years’ Venezuela
schooling
6. Percentage of urban young Over 15%: Bolivia, Brazil, Between 5% and 15%: Up to 5%: Chile, Panama
people between 13 and 17 Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Costa
who work Paraguay Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of ECLAC (1999).
Box 1
POVERTY IS NOT THE ONLY CAUSE OF DELINQUENCY
If it were:
– There would be more delinquency in the least developed countries, while the richest and most highly
developed countries would necessarily be the safest.
– The worst security crises should occur during the most devastating economic crises, but this has not neces-
sarily been the case.
– The areas of a country with the highest crime rates would be the most economically depressed areas, but
this is not always so.
– Among delinquents detected, there should be many workers earning the minimum wage, unemployed, or
people who have been looking for work for a long time.
– Crime rates should go down as the economy grows.
– The solution to delinquency would depend on economic policy and on the wealth distribution pattern.
– All poor people would be potential delinquents.
Source: Prepared on the basis of data from the Mexican Institute for the Study of Organized Crime, A.C. (IMECO, 1998).
in the economies of the region mean that large num-
bers of persons remain outside the formal labour
market and the resulting frustration drives them to
aggressive forms of behaviour, which would explain
the waves of violence breaking over the big cities of
the region. However, this form of analysis (pov-
erty-frustration-aggression) may be too superficial to
account for the varied and changing situations of vio-
lence observed. Indeed, there is evidence both for
and against this approach. A study made in Santiago,
Chile, estimated that an increase of one percentage
point in unemployment leads to 4% more offences
against property, thefts and robberies (García, 1997).
In the same country, however, it was found that there
was a greater propensity to violence among those
waiting to enter the labour force (jobless) or those al-
ready incorporated in it as wage earners than among
those most marginalized from the labour market
(Tironi, 1989). Attitudes of adaptation and resigna-
tion were observed among informal workers. It
would seem, then, that aggression is not the only re-
sponse to frustration, and that individuals who do re-
act aggressively do so because they have learned to
respond in this manner.
Even though poverty may not be the sole cause
of delinquency, it is nevertheless associated with it,
as are other factors such as inequality and social in-
justice. Many of those who blame poverty for delin-
quency base their views on the profile of delinquents
arrested and punished, who are mostly males of a
low socio-economic level. It must be borne in mind,
however, that the percentage of arrests is only small
compared with the total number of offences commit-
ted. There are a large number of unpunished of-
fences, such as economic offences or cases of
corruption, which are often difficult to prove, in-
volve economically powerful groups, and are likely
to be committed by persons of higher educational
and economic status.
4. The measurement of offences and their
economic cost
The measurement of violent offences is a difficult
matter because of the variety of definitions and clas-
sifications used to record them in different countries,
due to the differences in the levels and types of vio-
lence in Latin America. The concept of violence is
usually limited to physical violence, in order to facil-
itate the use of traditional forms of data collection,
such as records of injuries or deaths. Although it is
more difficult to assess the psychological or
emotional damage caused, however, this may never-
theless have disabling and permanent consequences
(Larraín, Vega and Delgado, 1997).
Most of the countries of the region do not have a
nationwide institution responsible for collecting, pro-
cessing and consolidating this type of statistics,
which makes it more difficult to determine the size
of the problem and to construct series which show
the evolution of violence and citizen security. With
regard to the recording of offences, there are three
types of sources of information: i) police records,
which register the complaints made and reflect the
response of civil society to the offences in question
(De Rementería, 1998); ii) judicial records, which
register court cases, and iii) health records, which
register deaths and injuries. No country of the region
carries out ongoing public opinion surveys to assess
the level and evolution of citizen security.
Moreover, the reliability of the statistics is af-
fected by the under-recording of some offences, such
as common violence and, above all, sexual and
intra-family violence. This latter type of violence is
on the increase in almost all the countries, assuredly
because more official complaints are lodged now
that this type of conduct is considered a criminal of-
fence rather than a private matter.
Some countries –Colombia, Chile, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Peru and Brazil– have made
improvements in the typification and definition of
levels of violence, in the measurement of its eco-
nomic cost, and in other forms of assessment of the
phenomenon such as surveys among victims which
make it possible to analyse the true rate of occur-
rence of violence.
Generally speaking, analyses of violence are
based on the statistics of violent crimes, especially
homicides, because of their serious nature and the
fact that they tend to be recorded more carefully and
reliably, thus permitting their comparison over time
and between countries (Rubio, 1998b). For the pur-
pose of comparisons in the region, the rate of homi-
cides per 100,000 inhabitants was used, which shows
that between the 1980s and the mid-1990s there was
an increase in violence in the region. International
comparisons made in the early 1990s put Latin
America and the Caribbean among the most violent
regions of the world, with average rates close to 20
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Guerrero, 1998).
More recently, in 1995, a case study in six countries
of the region (Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador,
PREVENTION OR REPRESSION? THE FALSE DILEMMA OF CITIZEN SECURITY • IRMA ARRIAGADA AND LORENA GODOY
C E P A L R E V I E W 7 0 • A P R I L 2 0 0 0 115
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) calculates the rate at 30
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (Londoño, 1998).
Between the 1980s and the mid-1990s, homicide
rates rose in all the subregions, as well as in Brazil
and Mexico. The highest rates were registered in the
Andean area, and the biggest increases were in Co-
lombia, where violence is now the main cause of
death. The lowest rates were in the Southern Cone
countries and the English-speaking Caribbean. The
tendency for homicide rates to affect men much
more than women continued (Arriagada and Godoy,
1999).
The rates have not only increased but also dis-
play great differences between subregions, countries,
and even between cities in the same country. Around
1995, there was a great contrast between El Salva-
dor, which had the highest murder rate in the region
(117 per 100,000 inhabitants), and Chile, which reg-
istered only 1.8 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants2
(table 2). The situation in El Salvador is striking on
account of its seriousness, although the figures must
be viewed with some caution because in that country
there is no governmental or non-governmental insti-
tution which systematically assembles the informa-
tion on violence. The data obtained are from the
Fiscalía General de la República and are the figures
with the greatest coverage, but they do not agree
with those from other sources.
In Colombia the relative figures for homicides
around 1995 are lower than those for 1990 (table 2),
but the number of offences has not gone down in ab-
solute terms and the perception of insecurity among
the population has been increasing (Trujillo and
Badel, 1998). Homicidal violence in Colombia has
become established as a routine and generalized
form of violence among the population and reflects a
country at war, since no present-day society displays
such levels of violence in times of peace (Rubio, 1998b).
Although there are differences between and
within countries,3 most of them register an increase
in homicides. Between 1980 and 1990 the homicide
rate went up in 9 out of 12 countries in region, and in
three of them it went up by a factor of between four
and six (Panama, Peru and Colombia). In the first
half of the 1990s, this rate had gone down in El Sal-
vador, Colombia, Chile and Peru but had gone up in
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (table 2).
With regard to robbery and theft, the statistical
information collected also displays great diversity
between countries, especially in the case of different
forms of robbery, where the rates per 100,000 inhab-
itants display extreme variability because of the dif-
ferent definitions of robbery and its various forms
and the differing coverage of the statistical records.
Other forms of crime have also increased. It is
estimated that annual kidnapping rates increased in
the early 1990s by over one point per 100,000 inhab-
itants in three countries: Colombia, Mexico and Gua-
temala. In Colombia they came to 9.7 per 100,000
inhabitants (Latin American Newsletter, 1997), while
in Guatemala, in spite of the obvious un-
der-recording of statistics on violence, cases of kid-
napping also increased, with 74.6% of the official
complaints of this crime being concentrated in the
department of Guatemala (Castellanos and Corrales
(eds.), 1998).
Attempts were made in the 1990s to measure the
economic costs of violence, although the varying
definitions of “economic costs” and the fragility of
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2 In Chile, the figures of 3.0 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
in 1990 and 1.8 per 100,000 in 1996 correspond to the com-
plaints in respect of homicides officially lodged with
Carabineros; in 1990 the number of cases of homicide brought
before the courts amounted to 9.1 per 100,000 inhabitants, and
in 1996 to 8.2 per 100,000, while the number of arrests for this
crime came to 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990 and 4.9 per
100,000 in 1996 (Fundación Paz Ciudadana, 1998a). Whichever
of these indicators is considered, however, the rates did go
down between 1990 and 1996.
3 In Colombia in 1996 the rates were 208 in Medellín, 108 in
Cali, 60 in Bogotá and 35 in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia,
Centro de Referencia Nacional sobre Violencia, 1996).
TABLE 2
Latin America (13 countries): Homicide rates
per 100,000 inhabitants, 1980, 1990 and 1995
Around 1995
Country Around 1980 Around 1990 (last available
figures)
El Salvador ... 138.2 117.0
Colombia 20.5 89.5 65.0
Honduras ... ... 40.0
Brazil 11.5 19.7 30.1
Mexico 18.2 17.8 19.5
Venezuela 11.7 15.2 22.0
Peru 2.4 11.5 10.3
Panama 2.1 10.9 ...
Ecuador 6.4 10.3 ...
Argentina 3.9 4.8 ...
Costa Rica 5.7 4.1 ...
Uruguay 2.6 4.4 ...
Paraguay 5.1 4.0 ...
Chile 2.6 3.0 1.8
Source: Ayres (1998); PAHO (1998); for Peru, INEI (1998); for
Chile, Fundación Paz Ciudadana (1998a), IDB (1998).
the statistical base make international comparisons
difficult (box 2). A comparative study made by the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), using a
common methodology, found that these costs were
considerable: in 1995 they came to 24.9 percentage
points of GDP in El Salvador, 24.7 points in Colom-
bia, 11.8 in Venezuela, 10.5 in Brazil, 12.3 in
Mexico and 5.1 in Peru (Londoño, 1998).
Violence causes heavy costs, affects the eco-
nomic and social development of a country in many
ways, and has negative effects on its physical capital
(Guerrero, 1998). In Peru, it is estimated that the
public infrastructure has suffered cumulative losses
of US$ 25 billion due to terrorism (Reyna and
Toche, 1999). Case studies made in Chile and Nica-
ragua have estimated the cost of domestic violence to
the economy at 2% of GDP in Santiago, Chile, and
1.6% of GDP in Managua, not counting the judicial
and police costs (Morrison and Orlando, 1997). In
Rio de Janeiro, the direct cost for attention to victims
and the economic costs for premature death and inca-
pacity in 1995 were estimated at some US$ 916 mil-
lion. Male victims accounted for 67.9% of the direct
cost of attention, 82.6% of the cost for incapacity,
and 94.9% of the economic cost for premature death
(ISER, Rede de Centros de Pesquisa, 1998).
Furthermore, violence depletes human capital,
causes a deterioration in people’s health, and leads to
absenteeism and labour incapacity of its victims,
among other effects. In the same study on Chile and
Nicaragua it is estimated that domestic violence has
severe repercussions on women’s income. In San-
tiago, Chile, woman who suffer severe physical vio-
lence earn only 39% as much as women who do not
suffer this type of abuse, and in Managua they earn
only 57% as much (Morrison and Orlando, 1997).
It has been shown that violence destroys social
capital. A study in Jamaica concluded that one of the
clearest impacts of violence was the social fragmen-
tation of communities, which makes it hard for any
community organization to work if it is not based on
fear and coercion (Moser and Holland, 1997).
Violence also affects the capacity of govern-
ments to combat it. The increase in violent acts
makes it necessary to spend resources on the fight
against violence which could otherwise be used for
development, and it also fosters corruption. Further-
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Box 2
TYPOLOGY AND DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF THE ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL COSTS CAUSED BY VIOLENCE
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) distinguishes between:
– Direct costs: through the health system, the police, the criminal justice system, housing and social services.
– Indirect costs: higher morbidity, higher mortality due to homicides and suicides, abuse of alcohol and
drugs, depressive disorders.
– Economic multiplier effects: macroeconomic impacts and impacts on the labour market and
inter-generational productivity.
– Social multiplier effects: impact on inter-person relations and on the quality of life.
Trujillo and Badel also distinguish between direct and indirect costs:
– However, they define the indirect costs as the negative secondary effects produced by violence, including:
losses of productivity; reduction or diversion of investment; faulty resource allocation and increased trans-
action costs (that is to say, what the IDB would classify under economic multiplier effects).
In macroeconomic terms, a distinction is drawn between:
– Gross costs: these correspond to the costs borne by the victim of an offence (for example, the ransom in
kidnapping).
– Net costs: these are the macroeconomic costs. Thus, a robbery or kidnapping does not give rise to costs in
macroeconomic terms: it is considered a transfer, since it neither adds value nor takes it away.
Source: IDB, 1998; Trujillo and Badel, 1998.
more, the population begin to have resort to private
security systems when they perceive that the State is
not effective in this respect, so that it gradually loses
legitimacy and importance. Finally, there is general
agreement on the negative effects of violence on
growth and on efforts to reduce poverty in the region
(Ayres, 1998).
To sum up, then, although the calculation of the
economic and social effects of violence is often only
partial, because of the lack of basic information to
put it on a proper footing, the economic impact of
the various forms of violence is only too clear, and
this is a useful point with regard to policies and
programmes aimed at reducing it.
5. The profile of victims and aggressors
Another aspect which needs to be taken into account
is the gender element in violence (not only in domes-
tic violence). Gender is seen to be a cultural factor
which puts certain people at risk and gives others a
predisposition to use violence. The main persons in-
volved in homicides are men, especially young men,
both as aggressors and as victims. In Latin America
external causes account for 20.5% of the total num-
ber of years of life lost through death or disability
due to all types of reasons in the case of men, and
8.1% in the case of women (PAHO/WHO, 1994). The
differences by sex are considerable in the 15 to 44
age group, since external causes are responsible for
51.7% of the deaths of men but only 24.5% of those
of women. Among men, the main external cause of
death is homicide (PAHO, 1998).
Along with sex, age is also a very important fac-
tor in the profile of victims and aggressors. Of all the
homicides reported in Latin America, 28.7% affect
young people between 10 and 19 years of age
(Guerrero, 1997). In Colombia, homicides mostly af-
fect young men between 15 and 34 –in 1996 65.2%
of the total number of homicides corresponded to
men in this age group– with 13 men being killed for
every woman (Colombia, Centro de Referencia
Nacional sobre Violencia, 1996). In Guatemala, ju-
venile gangs known as maras have appeared, which
are organizations made up of young people of both
sexes, including both minors and adults, which es-
tablish links of solidarity and identity among their
members. The maras fight for control of territories
which they consider to belong to them; it has been
estimated that in 1997 they operated in twelve zones
of Guatemala City, where they have been blamed for
committing hold-ups on buses and other offences
(Castellanos and Corrales, eds., 1998). In Chile, an
increase has been observed in the participation of
young people under 18 in cases of robbery with vio-
lence, where their participation has risen from 21%
in 1995 to 32% in 1997 (Fundación Paz Ciudadana,
1998a);4 similar features are displayed by the major-
ity of those arrested for offences, who tend to be un-
married young men of a low economic and social
level.
A study of crime statistics on drug offences be-
tween 1985 and 1994 concludes that young people
represent a disproportionately high share of arrests
but a disproportionately low share of prisoners held
in jail for all types of serious offences (homicide,
rape, robbery, theft and drugs). Between 1986 and
1993, for this set of offences, 35% of those arrested
were under 19 but only 12% of those actually sent to
prison were young people. This is held to show “the
high vulnerability of young people just for being
young, and the predisposition of the police to put the
blame on them” (De Rementería, 1998, p. 114).
Along with the greater participation of young
people in offences, there have also been changes in
the profile of delinquents and their modus operandi.
Police authorities in Chile note that in recent years
there has been an increase in the percentage of of-
fenders carrying arms (nearly 99%) and in the con-
sumption of drugs among them (70% of all young
offenders use drugs).5 Some studies note that there
has been a change in the patterns of conduct of those
found guilty of offences, as most of them are now
addicted to alcohol and drugs and are therefore more
likely to display violent attitudes than in the past
(Cooper, 1994).
6. Domestic and intra-family violence
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4 The last report of the Fundación Paz Ciudadana indicates that
between 1995 and 1998 the participation of young people be-
tween 14 and 18 in cases of robbery with violence increased by
207% (La Tercera, 1999).
5 Interview with police captain Marcelo Cáceres and study by
Fundación Paz Ciudadana, Adimark and Gendarmería referred
to in the article “Por qué gana la delincuencia” (Las Ultimas
Noticias, 1998).
6 All the countries of the region have ratified the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent, Punish and Eliminate Violence Against
Women (Belén do Pará, 1994). Most of the countries have
therefore modified their national legislation to include punish-
ment for cases of intra-family violence (Arriagada, 1998).
In the case of intra-family violence, which has
gained greater recognition in the law in recent years,6
the main victims are women. A transcultural study
covering 90 societies showed that those with high
levels of violence were also those that had authoritar-
ian rules in the household, where the man was the
dominant actor and there was social acceptance of
physical or psychological violence as a way of set-
tling conflicts (Levinson, cited in IDB, 1998).
It is estimated that over half of Latin American
women have been victims of aggression in their
homes at some moment in their lives, 33% have been
victims of sexual abuse between the age of 16 and
49, and 45% have suffered threats, insults or the de-
struction of personal possessions (United Nations,
1999).
As already noted, intra-family violence can be
physical, psychological or sexual. Some studies also
include indirect violence, such as forbidding the
spouse to study or work, isolation or confinement in
the home, or other forms of restriction of freedom.
Case studies and surveys carried out all over the
region bear witness to the magnitude of the problem
(table 3). The incidence of violence against women
varies from 40% to 80%, depending on the city
where the survey was carried out. It is hard to deter-
mine whether the upward trends in cases of domestic
violence are due to greater frequency of this type of
offence, to fuller recording of cases when the offence
is made subject to punishment under the law, or to
increases in the propensity to lodge official com-
plaints. In view of the seriousness of this phenome-
non, it is essential that surveys and studies should be
carried out to provide fuller and more detailed coun-
try information that will give a better idea of its mag-
nitude and tendencies.
Another form of intra-family violence which has
become more visible and frequent is violence against
children. It has been maintained that adolescents who
have been the victims of violence in their childhood
are more likely to become perpetuators of violence
themselves in later life. In Brazil, abandoned chil-
dren are at once the main victims and the main cul-
prits of urban violence (McAlister, 1998). Ayres
(1998) estimates that there are 6 million minors suf-
fering ill-treatment in the region, and 80,000 die each
year as a result of damage done to them by their par-
ents, relatives or other persons. A study made by
UNICEF in 1996 reveals that in São Paulo over 75%
of all the sexual attacks against minors reported to
SOS Niño were committed by family members (in the
following order: legitimate father, brother, stepfa-
ther, uncle), and 8% of the victims suffered this type
of violence before they were three years old.
Children have also been affected by the interne-
cine conflicts that have taken place in some countries
of the region. It is calculated that in Guatemala, be-
tween 100,000 and 250,000 children lost one or both
of their parents due to the war (PAHO, 1996). In that
country, a study carried out by the National Commis-
sion Against Child Ill-treatment on the basis of hos-
pital data shed light on three dimensions of the
phenomenon: physical ill-treatment, sexual abuse
and abandonment. Around 60% of cases of
ill-treatment and 55% of cases of abandonment af-
fected boys, while 94% of the sexual abuse was
against girls (Castellanos and Corrales, eds., 1998).
7. Equal access to public and private security
Violence and insecurity among the inhabitants of the
big cities give rise to significant social and economic
costs which are shared out unequally in society and
are one of the main obstacles to the development of
the region. It is estimated that Latin American resi-
dents purchase more than half of the insurance poli-
cies against kidnapping sold in the world (Newsweek,
1998). In Guatemala, for example, it is calculated
that total private expenditure on security is at least
20% greater than the public security budget
(Gutiérrez, 1998): there are some 200 private secu-
rity firms, some of them established by former mem-
bers of the army or police force, of which only 30 are
officially registered (Castellanos and Corrales, eds.,
1998). In São Paulo, there are three times as many
private security guards as the number of government
policemen (Newsweek, 1998).
In Santiago, Chile, there are clear differences
between the rich and poor sectors of the city.
Whereas the municipalities with the most resources
can organize security plans in coordination with the
police, and even make contributions in order to in-
crease the number of policemen assigned to a sector,
the poorer municipalities cannot do this. It is esti-
mated that the poorest communes of Greater San-
tiago are below the mean vigilance level equivalent
per 100,000 inhabitants,7 which introduces a factor
of inequity into the way police resources are distrib-
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7 The vigilance level equivalent is the supply of vigilance ser-
vices per commune (Silva, 1999).
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TABLE 3
Latin America: Incidence of domestic violence in the 1990s
Country Incidence of domestic violence
Argentina 1997. Complaints of domestic violence: 1,820
Buenos Aires 1998. 1,700 persons were attended in the Intra-Family Violence Unit, 70.5% of whom had been
attacked by their spouse (Hospital Alvear)
1998. The Argentine Association for the Prevention of Family Violence attended 5,000 persons
Bolivia 1994. It was estimated that out of 20,000 cases of violence reported, 75% corresponded to domestic
violence. Domestic violence mainly affects women between 17 and 36, while most of the victims of
sexual assaults are adolescent
Brazil (States of Rio de 1998. Out of 98,039 cases, 61% corresponded to bodily harm, 2% to sexual offences and 37% to
Janeiro, São Paulo, and Rio threats
Grande do Sul-Porto Alegre
Colombia 1996. Total number of complaints of marital violence: 10,725 women injured. Over 20% were
Santafé de Bogotá victims of physical abuse, 10% of sexual abuse, and 34% of psychological abuse
Costa Rica 1994. Total number of women attended in the Women’s Unit: 2,299
1995. Total number of women attended in the Women’s Unit: 5,445
Chile 1997. 40.7% of women between 15 and 19 living with a man suffered psychological, physical and/or
Santiago sexual violence
1998. Total number of complaints of attacks on women in the country: 39,394
1997. Total number of persons arrested for using violence against women in the country: 4,363
1998. Total number of complaints of intra-family violence dealt with in the country: 12,810
Ecuador 1997. 60% of women were being or had been beaten by their husbands: 37.3% “often”, 25%
Quito “sometimes” and 35.6% “rarely”
Honduras 1996. Number of complaints of domestic violence or sexual abuse between January and September:
3,070, i.e., 11 complaints per day
Mexico
Mexico City and 1995. 74% of all persons ill-treated were women, of whom 68% were between 13 and 34 years of age.
nine other cities Only 20% of the victims made an official complaint to the authorities
Monterrey and Nueva León 1995-1996. According to a survey made in Monterrey and Nueva León, 46% of all women over
15 living with a man said they had suffered psychological, physical or sexual violence at the hands of
their companion
Nicaragua 1994. Number of female victims of violence attended in non-governmental centres: 3,138
Managua 1997: 52.6% of women between 15 and 19 who were living with a man were victims of
psychological, physical and/or sexual violence; 28% of them suffered severe physical violence
Peru 1996. Number of complaints to the Police Unit for Women: 5,512
Lima 1996. In a survey of women in the middle and low economic and social sectors, 88% reported they had
suffered violence at the hands of their partner; 84% psychological violence, 31% physical violence, and
13% actual physical harm
It is estimated that there are 25,000 rapes per year
Dominican Republic 1994. Of the police reports and cases published in the press between 1990 and 1994, 95% were for
violence against women and minors, of which 67% corresponded to homicides, 25% to beatings
and 12% to rape
Uruguay 1997. 47.3% of the households studied registered cases of violence: moderate psychological violence,
Montevideo and Canelones 24.6%; purely psychological violence, 12%; purely sexual violence, 0.7%; moderate physical violence,
4.6%, and severe physical violence, 5.4%
Venezuela 1995. Data from the Bicameral Commission of Congress: 75,530 cases of sexual violence
1997. Data from the Policía Técnica Judicial: 7,426 sexual offences where women were the victims:
rape, seduction, kidnapping or incest. Twelve women were raped every day
Source: United Nations Inter-Agency Campaign on Women’s Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean; Duque (1998); Reyna and Toche
(1999).
uted to combat crime throughout the city (Silva,
1999). Shortage of resources makes it necessary to
establish priorities: thus, the central government opts
to defend certain urban sectors –usually the city cen-
tre and commercial and financial areas– at the ex-
pense of other sectors such as working-class areas.
This situation means that often public security is left
to the community itself.
Although organized community participation in
the fight against violence can serve to strengthen the
programmes applied by the local authorities, prob-
lems arise when such participation is seen as the only
alternative because of the lack of police protection,
and not a complement to it.
The access to private security –i.e., the capacity
to hire alarm services and private guards– is also un-
equal: these goods and services are shared out un-
equally among the different social strata, thus
widening the differences between them. Insecurity in
the high-income sectors has led to changes in the ur-
ban configuration of the cities and has restricted
neighbourhood sociability through such develop-
ments as the establishment of closed neighbourhoods
and shopping centres (malls) and the increase in con-
dominiums and private guards.
The sensation of greater vulnerability and lack
of protection differs markedly in the different
socio-economic sectors. Whereas in the lower-class
sectors insecurity takes the form of fear of attacks on
one’s physical integrity, in the higher-income areas it
takes the form of fear for one’s property.8 In the
more prosperous groups, the range of security ser-
vices and products available to them often serves to
complement the protection provided by the police; in
the poorer sectors, the only option may be to orga-
nize vigilance groups and other more rudimentary
systems of protection against hold-ups and other
crimes (home-made alarm systems). In Guatemala,
nearly 200,000 persons have formed vigilance orga-
nizations. A recent measurement of the degree of in-
security in the different communes of Santiago,
Chile, found that the highest levels of fear were in
the poorest communes,9 which fits in with the fact
that these are the communes where there is the great-
est lack of protection and police vigilance. Another
survey made in January 1999 on the degree of secu-
rity felt to exist in the neighbourhood found that al-
though, overall, a large proportion (70%) of women
said they felt safe in their neighbourhood, this pro-
portion went down to 66% among women between
34 and 45 and women from the sectors of lower
socio-economic level (Grupo Iniciativa Mujer,
1999). However, a study made between 1996 and
1998 on offences against property in 17 Latin Ameri-
can countries reveals that the percentage of those in-
terviewed who have been victims of such offences
goes up in proportion to their socio-economic level
and the size of the city where they live and recent
growth in the urban population (Gaviria and Pagés,
1999).
Kidnapping for economic gain mainly affects
the moneyed sectors of the population, and may even
cause them to leave the country. In Guatemala, for
example, at least five important families, totalling
some 40 persons, all of which have suffered kidnap-
ping or extortion, have left the country because of
the State’s inability to give them protection.
Private security measures have also been re-
flected in the proliferation of arms among the civil-
ian population, with results contrary to those
expected. Rather than reducing crime rates (robber-
ies or homicides), this ready availability of arms
can increase and aggravate the consequences of acts
of social or domestic violence, since attempts at self-
defence increase the risk that the victims may be
killed.
In the face of these developments, the capacity
of the police and judicial institutions to control and
judge offences has been swamped, and there has
been a growing tendency to take justice into one’s
own hands and privatize security. Fear, the lack of
effective justice, and the increased violence of of-
fenders have increased the perception of insecurity
of Latin American citizens.
8. Traditional and emergent forms of violence
and delinquency
The appearance of new forms of violence and delin-
quency in various countries of the region has been
observed in a number of different ambits. Some ana-
lysts have described these new forms as a heterodox
and contradictory mixture of two types of violence
present all over the region: political violence
(guerrilla movements, torture, disappearance of per-
sons, repression) and traditional criminal violence.
The symbiosis of the two gives rise to a form of so-
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8 See ECLAC (1997), in the chapter entitled “Agenda social”.
9 El Mercurio (1999): article based on a survey made by the
Fundación Paz Ciudadana.
cial violence which, although not exclusively politi-
cal, does have political effects, so that it cannot be
viewed merely as breaking the law (Castañeda,
1998).
Various authorities and specialists have declared
to the mass media that the new forms of violence are
attributable to a change in delinquents’ modus ope-
randi. In Chile, the evolution of delinquents’ actions
in the 1990s reflects a process of organization and
planning of their offences (learning how to obtain
arms and/or vehicles, studying the routines of their
possible victims, etc.), and they now operate more in
groups and carry arms. For other specialists, in con-
trast, forms of action such as the intimidation and
physical and psychological ill-treatment of their vic-
tims –together with the use of arms, narcotics or par-
alyzing gases and masks, which have become more
common in recent years– may also be due to the imi-
tation of crime movies (La Epoca, 1995).
In some Central American countries, demobi-
lized soldiers who previously served in the army or
the guerrilla have become a mass of unemployed
who are familiar with the use of arms and military
strategy and have an abundant supply of arms at their
disposal. In many cases these unemployed persons
have formed armed bands which, in the view of
some specialists, are one the main sources of armed
crime in the region. In Guatemala it is estimated that
there are some 600 organized criminal bands with a
total of 20,000 members, mostly led by former army
officers (Gutiérrez, 1998).
In other countries, the reform of the police
forces has led to similar situations. In Argentina,
Peru and Brazil these reforms have left a consider-
able number of former policemen unemployed, thus
helping to develop a more sophisticated form of
crime carried out by quasi-military bands. “This
means an increase not only in the number of criminal
actions but also in their planning, their level of vio-
lence, and the importance of their targets” (El
Mercurio, 1998a). Many of these bands are responsi-
ble for the many cases of kidnapping which have
taken place in the region. Experts note that this type
of crime is common in Colombia, where kidnapping
has taken on the nature of a well-organized industry;
in Mexico, where it is connected with small organi-
zations and drug trafficking; in Brazil, where it is
connected with organized crime and difficulties in
applying the law, and in Guatemala, where it is car-
ried out by the numerous criminal bands mentioned
earlier (Qué Pasa, 1998).
Even more disturbing because of the magnitude
of the resources they divert and their international ef-
fects, however, are the emergent forms of interna-
tional crime which have arisen thanks to the existence
of open, globalized market economies. Among these
emergent forms are the new forms of drug trafficking,
illicit activities involving electronic fraud (basically
through credit cards), and the traffic in persons, hu-
man organs and blood products, and nuclear weap-
ons and materials (IMECO, 1998). It has been asserted
that international criminal organizations have taken
more advantage of technical progress than the insti-
tutions responsible for watching over citizen secu-
rity.
II
Policies for generating greater citizen security
1. The limitations of conventional approaches
centering on control and repression, and the
emergence of more integral approaches
a) Conventional approaches
Many of the efforts made in the region to tackle
delinquency and violence have approached the prob-
lem from a conventional standpoint based on the
police-justice-prison model, which places emphasis
on the adoption of policies to control and repress
crime and criminal violence. Not enough attention
has been given to preventive measures, whose results
are slower but are usually more efficient than those
of corrective approaches in terms of cost and are
more effective for securing lasting solutions.
The results of the conventional model, which is
long on repression and short on prevention, have not
been satisfactory. It has not been able to reduce
crime –indeed, the rate of homicides has gone up in
the region– or the growing sensation of insecurity
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among the inhabitants of the main cities, and the ju-
dicial, police and prison systems are faced with seri-
ous problems and shortcomings. The main criticisms
of this approach are that it does not view violence as
a social phenomenon involving various different fac-
tors and that it only seeks to act by repressing violent
individuals, without doing anything to influence the
family and social environment.
b) More integral approaches
The unsatisfactory results obtained make it de-
sirable to review the approach in question and the
underlying conception of the phenomenon of vio-
lence and delinquency. There is evidence that this
phenomenon is fundamentally something which is
learned, through physical abuse or exposure to it dur-
ing childhood or through the influence of the media,
post-war environments and cultural values which ac-
cept or promote the solution of conflicts by violent
means. This means that if indeed violence is the re-
sult of responses which have been learned rather than
innate tendencies, then violent forms of conduct can
be changed. This is very important for policy formu-
lation.
Another aspect which has assumed increased
importance is the interpretation of violence as a mul-
tidimensional phenomenon which must be tackled
with integral strategies in order to influence the indi-
vidual, family, social and cultural factors that gener-
ate it. In order to understand violence, then, we must
eschew “purely symptomatic approaches and simple
reactions and recognize it as a psycho-social, political
and cultural phenomenon on which isolated measures
can only have marginal effects” (Krauskopf, 1996).
In line with this attitude, the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO) and the Pan-American Health Orga-
nization (PAHO) have adopted an “epidemiological
approach” for dealing with violence. The adoption of
this approach in some Latin American cities has been
reflected in the application of a group of measures:
i) integral measures focussed on the risk factors
most often observed in cases of criminal violence;
ii) short-term police control measures to deal
with specific phenomena, sometimes for a limited
period of time, with reforms in the judicial, police
and prison systems which call for political and social
consensus;
iii) preventive measures accompanied by police
follow-ups such as controls over carrying weapons
and consuming alcohol and drugs;
iv) primary preventive measures aimed at
changing the attitudes, standards and forms of social
behaviour of the population in general, and
v) secondary preventive measures aimed at
high-risk groups such as young men who have been
witnesses or victims of violence when they were
children.
c) Common criteria
From the set of actions in the field of citizen se-
curity which are being carried out in the region and
are listed in a survey made by ECLAC,10 it may be
gathered that there is growing recognition of the
need to carry out multidimensional programmes
combining both control and preventive measures. A
number of these programmes share some common
criteria which could help to make measures in this
field more integral.
One of these criteria is inter-agency coordina-
tion, which seeks to give measures to reduce the
number of offences and increase their rate of punish-
ment the necessary simultaneity, even though they
are adopted at different levels: the community, local
governments, private and governmental bodies, the
police, judicial and prison systems, educational and
labour bodies, etc.
Another common criterion is that of citizen par-
ticipation, which means involving the population
more fully into the problem of security and the
search for effective solutions, by promoting the cre-
ation of networks of relations and organizing the
community itself (social capital) to improve the pre-
vention and reporting of offences and even achieve
some degree of control over them. It is also neces-
sary to promote closer relations between the commu-
nity and the police and State institutions, since
greater confidence of the population in those institu-
tions can be essential for improving the perception of
security and heightening the legitimacy of the politi-
cal, police and judicial system in the fight against
crime. In order for citizen participation to make an
effective contribution to the prevention of delin-
quency, it must not be promoted only among the
poor or marginal sectors, as a way of making up for
the lack of resources. Organization of the citizens
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10 For the preparation of the chapter on citizen security in the
Social Panorama of Latin America 1998 (ECLAC, 1999) a
small survey was made among governors and mayors of Latin
American cities in order to determine the main security prob-
lems in their cities and the measures, programmes and policies
being adopted to deal with them.
can in no case replace the efforts that the central and
local governments should make to tackle citizen in-
security, nor can it take the place of the resources
that should be devoted to this task.
Finally, a third criterion found in various differ-
ent programmes is the use of prevention through ed-
ucational programmes which promote the peaceful
settlement of conflicts by strengthening forms of
conduct based on dialogue, collaboration and under-
standing.
The following sections describe the main mea-
sures implemented in the field of prevention and
control, together with some proposals for improving
the recording of offences at the national and regional
levels and details of some cases where satisfactory
results have been obtained by combining control and
preventive measures.
2. Preventive measures
Particularly important measures in this respect in-
clude educational programmes, organization of the
community, control of trafficking in alcohol, drugs
and arms, and measures to combat poverty and in-
equality.
a) Educational programmes
These programmes can help to forestall violence
in various ways. Firstly, they can do so by reducing
the drop-out rate in schools. A number of studies
have identified a relation between low educational
levels and violence,11 with high rates of dropping out
from school among those who have committed some
kind of offence. This is so in the case of the majority
of the young people who are members of the many
gangs which are responsible for much of urban vio-
lence. It has been stated that dropping-out of the edu-
cational system by young people reflects a
deterioration in the perception of the economic value
of education, that is to say, in the economic viability
of the educational system, and a failure of the type of
education provided to adapt to the needs of young
people and their motives for attending school. As a
number of studies have shown, those motives may be
quite different from those assumed as the basis for
the educational system, and may consist of the desire
to get away from the house without causing prob-
lems (especially in the case of girls), to meet new
friends, or to gain access to social and sporting activ-
ities (Krauskopf, 1996).12
Secondly, they can educate people to prefer the
peaceful settlement of conflicts. Since the social learn-
ing process –especially in childhood– has a vital influ-
ence on whether or not people later take violent
attitudes, formal and informal educational programmes
which develop the skills to settle conflicts peacefully
can give very good results. In the medium and long
term, they legitimize non-violent ways of dealing with
problems more effectively than other methods and pro-
tect individuals from the danger of acting violently.
Some educational campaigns along these lines have
helped to focus public attention on problems such as
intra-family violence. This is particularly interesting
because of the incidence of experiences of this type on
the adoption of violent attitudes to the settlement of
conflicts in adult life, which is often due to the diffi-
culty experienced in childhood in internalizing patterns
of control and self-control which allow persons to han-
dle their aggressive feelings.13
The Anti-Violence Seminars held in Santafé de
Bogotá are campaigns designed to foster more
constructive conduct models in man-woman and
father-child relations, along with peaceful ways of
settling conflicts in the home (Alcaldía Mayor de
Santafé de Bogotá, 1997).
Outside Latin America, a very interesting exam-
ple is that of the work done by the Peace Education
Foundation (PEF), a non-profit-making organization
which has been carrying out peace education
programmes since 1980 in 20,000 schools in the
United States and has now extended its activities to
Canada and Jamaica. Staring from the assumption
that boys and/or girls are not born with innate skills
in the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the PEF pro-
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11 In Lima, for example, a study carried out by the IDB showed
that low educational levels of the men were a key variable
among the factors leading to domestic violence.
12 In this connection, it is worth noting the work done by
Hommies Unidos in El Salvador or the group “Los Especiales”
in Bogotá, which seek to bring juvenile gang members into the
educational system by giving them special opportunities for at-
tending school (Guerrero, 1997).
13 The IDB has prepared a video on this subject, entitled Bat-
tered lives, shattered hopes: when a man beats a woman, which
has been distributed throughout the region as an integral ele-
ment in the IDB’s campaign to generate an awareness of the im-
portance of this matter (IDB, 1997).
14 Evaluations made in 1991 in Dade County, Florida, showed
that 86% of the conflicts where mediation was used in school
were successfully settled, while an evaluation made among 163
parents who attended a workshop showed that 79% had im-
proved the way conflicts and feelings were treated in the home
(El Mercurio, 1998b).
motes the development of skills which will lead chil-
dren and adults to face problems in the home, school
and community in a non-violent manner. For this pur-
pose, it uses innovative action programmes which in-
clude mediation in conflicts between schoolmates or
workmates (training peacemakers) and direct training
of students, teachers and parents as monitors.14
Programmes of education for peace should seek
to promote responsibility for one’s actions; punish-
ment of aggressive forms of conduct in a climate of
affection; rewards for constructive and non-aggres-
sive forms of conduct; non-aggressive models, and
empathy with others (box 3).
b) Organization of the community
Organization of the community has become an
essential resource for the implementation of more in-
tegral security models, the aim being to promote the
formation of networks of relations and organizations
within the community itself and to foster links be-
tween the community and the police and State insti-
tutions for tackling crime.
These types of committees have been organized
in most of the cities covered by the ECLAC study:
Neighbourhood Preventive Councils in Buenos Ai-
res, Local Security Fronts in Bogotá, Citizens’ Com-
mittees in Mexico City, Community Security
Councils in Saõ Paulo, Neighbourhood Committees
in San José, Costa Rica, and proposals for the estab-
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Box 3
ATTITUDES THAT SHOULD BE FOSTERED BY EDUCATION FOR PEACE
Seeking to make people feel responsible for their own actions
This helps to inhibit aggression, since when people act in a “faceless”, anonymous manner they tend to act
more aggressively because they feel less responsible and are less conscious of the prohibitions against destruc-
tive and aggressive actions
Seeking to punish unacceptable forms of conduct in a climate of affection
Severe punishment, whether in children or adults, usually secures submission, but rarely “sinks in”. Parents
who are accustomed to apply severe punishment usually have extremely aggressive children; in contrast, chil-
dren who are punished by adults in the context of an affective relationship can experience a strengthening of
their non-aggressive tendencies, since they usually comply with the adults’ wishes even when the latter are not
present.
Rewarding non-aggressive patterns of conduct
Efforts should be made to strengthen and reward constructive and non-aggressive patterns of conduct which
will enable children to cope with situations of frustration. Although it is neither possible nor advisable to try to
prevent children from experiencing frustration altogether, because a child who is prevented from experiencing
frustration will suffer even more pain and confusion when he finally is faced with it, it is perfectly possible to
train children to respond to frustrating situations in a constructive and satisfactory manner.
Offering non-aggressive models
The presence of persons who react to difficult situations without being aggressive can be an important check
on aggressive forms of conduct.
Fostering empathy with others
Carrying out “empathy training activities”, such as teaching children to put themselves in the other’s place, to
play differing roles in different situations, or to strengthen relations with friends can be very positive. Most
people find it hard to voluntarily cause pain to another person, unless they can find some way of
de-humanizing the situation.
Source: Aronson (1995).
lishment of neighbourhood citizen security commit-
tees in Santiago, Chile.
Other ways of promoting community organiza-
tion include: combination of police patrols with the
training of promoters to inform the community about
crime and the application of various forms of preven-
tion at the community level (public security
programme in Mexico City); increased use of com-
munity alarms (Medellín, Colombia); coordination of
neighbourhood councils, Mothers’ Unions and youth
and civic organizations (Santa Cruz, Bolivia), and
coordination among the police, municipalities and
neighbours (such as the door-to-door programme ap-
plied by the police in Santiago, Chile, and the VIVA
community police programme in Rio de Janeiro).
Forms of organization for forestalling and pun-
ishing intra-family violence are worthy of special at-
tention, since the mobilization of women, who are
the main victims of this type of violence, has been a
key element in securing the adoption of laws in this
respect in various countries of the region (box 4) and
the establishment of social support networks for vic-
tims, which have increased the number of official
complaints lodged against cases of this type of vio-
lence (refuges for victims in Peru, and the Family
Friend telephone programme in El Salvador, which
alerts the relevant institutions about cases of vio-
lence). Programmes aimed at the main aggressors
(predominantly men) have also been organized (Men
Against Violence, in Nicaragua, and the Men’s Col-
lective for Equal Relations, A.C. in Mexico (Red de
Salud de las Mujeres Lationamericanas y del Caribe,
1996).
c) Control of the sale of alcohol, drug trafficking
and carrying weapons
Alcohol and drugs are increasingly associated
with acts of violence and crime. In Medellín, for ex-
ample, many of the juvenile gangs were formed by
drug traffickers for the transport of drugs and protec-
tion of transactions. The drug trade is also linked
with the internationalization of criminal activities,
through the increasingly frequent connections be-
tween local organizations and groups in other parts
of the region and Europe. It is therefore urgently nec-
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Box 4
COSTA RICA: SOME LESSONS THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE CAMPAIGN
FOR A LAW AGAINST VIOLENT TREATMENT OF WOMEN
Actions
– Organization of a collective initiative to promote wide support for the adoption of a law
– Preparation of a plan of work aimed at generating a process of discussion for preparing the draft, creating
favourable conditions for its adoption, coordinating the efforts of different institutions, sensitizing public
opinion, and strengthening the work of women and of the anti-violence movement
– Broad participation in the preparation of the draft, reflecting the views of the women affected
– Ongoing discussion of the content of the draft law and analysis of strategies for reaching political agree-
ments
– Lobbying among members of Congress, taking due account of the procedures of the congress in question
and the limited negotiating experience of women
– Establishment of a mechanism for coordination and follow-up of the fulfillment of the law once it is
adopted
Main criteria applied
– To motivate the participation of women from different organizations and social sectors
– To foster involvement in political negotiation
– To adapt expectations in the face of adverse conditions
– To keep up collective coordination, with the will to persevere both in the negotiation and the subsequent
follow-up
Source: Campaign for a Law Against Marital Violence, 1997.
essary to go beyond the eminently police-oriented
treatment often given to the drug problem and
strengthen preventive and rehabilitation activities at
the same time that measures are taken to improve the
institutional capability of the police and judicial sys-
tem to control such traffic.
There are various preventive programmes
against the consumption of alcohol and drugs, among
them the Programme to Educate and Foster Rejec-
tion of Drugs in Schools (PROERD) in São Paulo and
the DESEPAZ programme in Colombia, which has
given strategic support to the restrictions imposed by
municipalities on the sale of alcohol after a certain
time of night (for example, the so-called “carrot
time” in Santafé de Bogotá).15
The incidence of the carrying of arms on the in-
crease in the seriousness of acts of violence calls for
action to avoid the proliferation of arms in society as
a supposed means of self-defence, especially in
countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua
and Colombia. Measures such as restrictions on the
right to carry arms and programmes for exchanging
arms for useful goods have secured reductions in ho-
micide rates. In Santafé de Bogotá the restrictions on
the carrying of arms applied in September and Octo-
ber 1997 reduced common homicides by 30% in
September and 23.3% in October, compared with the
same months in 1996 (Alcaldía Mayor de Santafé de
Bogotá, 1997), while in Panama the “Guns for Food”
programme has also had satisfactory results: the
population gives up arms, without having to explain
their origin or being investigated, and receives food
vouchers in exchange.
d) Combating poverty and inequality
If violence is seen as the result of anomy or so-
cial breakdown, then in order for there to be citizen
security it will be necessary to create the economic,
political and social conditions that favour the devel-
opment and social cohesion of a country (Piñeyro
and Barajas, 1995). From this point of view, poverty
–and especially relative poverty– becomes a problem
of security, not because being poor automatically
turns people into delinquents, but because poverty
can produce social fragmentation and become an ob-
stacle to development. This is how the problem has
been understood by the authorities of a number of
cities which have incorporated efforts to improve the
living conditions of the poorest sectors among the
measures to cope with the citizens’ feeling of insecu-
rity. In Rio de Janeiro, for example, there is the
Favela/Barrio Popular programme, which seeks to
improve the urbanization of the favelas as a way of
integrating them into the city (De Cerqueira, 1995);
in Managua measures have been taken to regularize
land ownership titles; in Santa Cruz (Bolivia) efforts
are being made to improve the quality of education
and health services, as well as access to them, and in
Lima the authorities are carrying out a programme
for the recovery of abandoned children (Jardineritos)
and a programme for bringing children to the Mu-
nicipal Child Aid Complex (ECLAC, 1999).
The generation of employment is another mea-
sure worthy of consideration, especially for young
people mixed up in violent actions. The rate of un-
employment among young people accounts for over
half of all unemployment in the urban areas of Latin
America (ECLAC, 1999). In view of the importance of
work as a means of social integration and as a life
project for many young people,16 policies aimed at
forestalling violence should seek to increase employ-
ment opportunities for large numbers of young peo-
ple as a way of overcoming the hiatus between the
provision of skills and capabilities by the State and
the ability of young people to take advantage of
them.
An interesting example in this respect is that of
Cali (Colombia), where a Social Coexistence Pact
was concluded, under the DESEPAZ programme, be-
tween army officers and young gang leaders. In this
Pact the authorities undertook to provide supplies
and technical training for the young people, as well
as job opportunities and legal aid, while the young
people undertook to give up the armed conflict, stop
their illegal activities, and make dialogue a key strat-
egy for settling conflicts.
Employment also has important effects for the
victims of violence, as it can help to change the bal-
ance of power in relations, as in the case of domestic
violence. A study made by the IDB in Nicaragua in
1997 revealed that 41% of women who were not in
paid employment were victims of serious physical
violence, whereas among those who worked outside
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15 It is important to bear in mind that measures of this type must
be in keeping with the particular situation in each country and
not represent restrictions on civil liberties.
16 Krauskopf (1996) has suggested that for some young people
work may be a more constructive and equalitarian means of es-
tablishing social relations than attending school.
the home and received an income the corresponding
percentage was only 10% (IDB, 1997). Other studies
have revealed that being a victim of this type of vio-
lence can reduce women’s possibilities of obtaining
paid employment and also reduce the income they
receive (Morrison and Orlando, 1997). These data
show the positive effect that incorporation in the la-
bour force can have in reducing both domestic and
non-domestic violence.
3. Control measures
The main control measures applied in the region are
in three fields: the police system, the judicial system
and the prison system. The shortcomings observed in
all these fields highlight the need to make reforms
that will enable them to fulfill their purpose properly.
a) Reforms in the police system
The inefficiency of the police system in combat-
ing delinquency has clearly revealed the problems
from which it suffers, such as its reactive and bu-
reaucratic nature, the lack of professional excellence
and equipment of its personnel, low wages, the mul-
tiplicity of functions that the police have to fulfill,
and cases of corruption. A number of proposals have
been put forward for dealing with these problems:
i) formulating strategic plans to overcome the
reactive nature of the system, so that it can be one
jump ahead of events and can foresee possible situa-
tions;
ii) raising the professional level of the police
through general training programmes and training in
specific techniques against such offences as kidnap-
ping, drug trafficking and mugging;
iii) reducing the many and varied functions of
the police, giving priority to law enforcement func-
tions rather than those of an administrative nature;
iv) increasing the number of policemen;
v) increasing the pay of the police in order to
improve their professional level and remove the
temptation to moonlight as private security guards,
and
vi) strengthening the work of police control bod-
ies, bringing to judgment members of the police who
engage in illicit activities and thoroughly investigat-
ing accusations of torture or unnecessary violence.
Among the measures which have been applied
in the region are: strengthening of the police through
programmes of education in human rights, in Colom-
bia; programmes to increase efficiency and honesty
in the Department of Public Prosecutions in Mexico
City; requirement of full secondary education for en-
tering the police force, and an increase in activities to
check police corruption, in São Paulo (ECLAC, 1999),
and the plan applied by the Chilean police force in-
volving the retraining of administrative personnel to
carry out normal police duties, investment in logisti-
cal support, preparation of management indicators,
and incorporation of new techniques such as comput-
erized maps of crime locations.
b) Reforms in the judicial system
A number of countries in the region have em-
barked on programmes to reform the judicial system
in order to strengthen its capacity to control and pun-
ish offences, reduce the level of impunity, and give
the population a feeling of greater security and more
confidence in the existing institutions. Some of these
reforms are aimed at:
i) improving coordination between the judicial
and police systems;
ii) allocation of greater resources to make it pos-
sible to investigate more offences, introduce new in-
formation systems, and raise the professional level of
the staff;
iii) better adaptation of the sentences applied in
order to overcome the problem of disproportionate
punishment (for example, avoiding cases where of-
fences of different levels of gravity are given the
same punishment) and to ensure that the sentences
are actually carried out;
iv) improving the treatment of victims: a more
professional approach in dealing with reports of of-
fences can help to shed light on the motives behind
offences and to improve the way the information is
recorded.
Latterly, alternative ways of applying justice
have been developed which can provide a more ex-
pedite and timely way of settling cases of minor of-
fences. Examples of such new methods are
programmes to bring justice closer to the population,
based on the peaceful settlement of conflicts, such as
the Conciliation and Mediation Centres and the Fam-
ily Precincts, both introduced in Colombia.17
c) Reforms in the prison system
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17 Around 1997, Santafé de Bogotá had 33 Conciliation and
Mediation Centres (IPC, 1997; Alcaldía Mayor de Santafé de
Bogotá, 1997).
There are some serious shortcomings in the re-
gion’s prison system which have given rise to serious
problems. They include the extreme overcrowding in
prisons, which prevents the necessary segregation of
prisoners accused of minor offences from those
guilty of serious crimes, the high percentage of pris-
oners who have not yet been sentenced –70%, ac-
cording to International Prison Watch (1995)– and
the serious shortcomings in the work of rehabilita-
tion. These situations tend to distort the functions
that prisons should play, which should be to punish
according to the crime committed and to rehabilitate
their inmates.18
Some of the measures proposed for dealing with
these problems are:
i) the effective application in prison systems of
the various international instruments on detainees
which the countries have signed or ratified;
ii) the effective allocation in national budgets of
the resources needed to improve the material condi-
tions of the prisons of the region;
iii) more expedite trials and the elimination of
the biases in the administration of justice which un-
justly favour some prisoners (such as important drug
dealers) and prejudice the rights of others (such as
poor people, children and young people);
iv) measures to combat corruption and impunity
not only in the case of criminals but also, when nec-
essary, of guards and gang bosses inside the prisons,
in order to put an end to the trafficking of drugs and
arms and the many other abuses;
v) better use of the time that prisoners are con-
fined for their rehabilitation, with special emphasis
on educational, vocational training and psychological
support, which have made it possible in other parts
of the world to reduce the rate of recidivation;19
vi) the promotion of alternative systems of
punishment without deprivation of liberty, since the
authoritarian and oppressive environment of many
prisons, together with the severe and restrictive
punishments, can foster aggression (Aronson, 1995):
it is therefore important to offer those who have
committed only minor offences some type of alterna-
tive to imprisonment, subject of course to the neces-
sary systems of supervision and control.
4. Preparation and improvement of systems of
crime statistics
One of the most keenly felt needs when dealing with
criminal violence and citizen security is the ability to
gain a proper idea of the size and nature of the phe-
nomenon in the region. It is therefore essential to im-
prove the existing systems of statistics and work on
the development of an integrated system which will
make it possible to follow up trends and make inter-
national comparisons.
Having this type of information available is vital
for making diagnoses of crime, formulating policies
and programmes in line with actual conditions, and
evaluating the action taken.
Some initiatives have been taken in Colombia in
this respect, such as the system of recording offences
using an epidemiological approach under the
DESEPAZ programme20 and the proposal to set up lo-
cal crime watch bodies as part of the national strat-
egy in support of Peaceful Coexistence and Citizen
Security, which should provide the basic inputs for
the design, execution and evaluation of anti-crime
policies by the authorities (Salazar and Castro,
1998).
In Chile, a joint programme between the govern-
ment and a private organization has designed a
Unified System of Crime Statistics (SUED, in Span-
ish) which integrates the information produced and
collected at the police, judicial and prison levels, ap-
plying rules to make it internationally comparable.
Computerized crime occurrence maps have also be-
gun to be prepared at the commune level in order to
permit the spatial identification of the most conflict-
ive areas (Chile, SUED, 1997).
5. Combining preventive and control measures
Before looking at some examples of programmes
which combine both these types of measures, we will
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18 Another problem which has been mentioned is that of the
continued presence of some prisoners in jail even after they
have completed their sentence, because of the lack of suitable
institutions for receiving them. This is the case, for example,
with prisoners suffering from psychiatric problems.
19 The Fundación Paz Ciudadana estimates that in Chile the
recidivation rate is close to 55%.
20 This system registers the time and date of the offence, the
identity of the victim and culprit, the level of alcohol, sex and
age of victim and culprit, the causes of the offence, the place of
occurrence, and the address of the victim.
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summarize the preventive and control measures de-
scribed earlier (box 5).
In order to achieve an effective combination of
preventive and control actions to reduce criminal vi-
olence, three Colombian cities (Santafé de Bogotá,
Medellín and Cali) have developed multidimensional
citizen security programmes (DESEPAZ) which tackle
the problem of civil insecurity on three fronts: en-
forcement of the law, education for peace, and con-
struction of community institutions to foster peaceful
coexistence.
In Santafé de Bogotá, a security programme
was established in 1994 based on measures to
strengthen peaceful coexistence and negotiated so-
lutions to conflicts through, for example, “healthy
policies” to tackle the problem of citizen insecurity
(box 6).
In Medellín, the Mayor’s office has imple-
mented programmes to help children and young peo-
ple of poor communities who are in conflict
situations, through the education, recreation and
resocialization of young people, community partici-
pation, and use of the influence of the mass media to
prevent violence and improve relations between the
police and the community.
The measures taken in these three Colombian
cities have indeed helped to reduce urban violence.
Homicides in the three cities have gone down
steadily in recent years. Thus, for example, in 1994
Santafé de Bogotá registered 3,885 homicides, but
this figure went down to 3,531 in 1996 and 2,813 in
1997: a reduction of 27%. Similar results were ob-
tained in Cali and Medellín, with the total number of
homicides (in absolute figures) going down by 27%
in Cali and 35% in Medellín over the same period.
This reduction contrasts sharply with the national av-
erage, which went down by only 5%, and with the
average for the other large cities of the country,
where the total number of homicides went up by 3%
(Salazar and Castro, 1998).
In view of the results of these programmes and
other specific actions, the Colombian National
Planning Department and the IDB formulated a na-
tional strategy in support of Peaceful Coexistence
Box 5
MEASURES FOR GENERATING GREATER CITIZEN SECURITY
Preventive measures Control measures
Educational programmes Reforms in the police system
Reduction of school dropout rate Establishment of strategic plans
Education for the peaceful settlement of conflicts Raising the professional level of the police
Reducing the police’s functions
Increasing the number of policemen
Raising police pay
Strengthening the control mechanisms for the police system
Organization of the community Reforms in the judicial system
Coordination between the judicial and police systems
Allocation of greater resources
Ensuring punishment is proportional to the crime
Improving treatment of victims
Control of the sale of alcohol, drug trafficking Reforms in the prison system
and the carrying of arms Application of the relevant international instruments in prison
systems
Proper and effective budgetary allocation
Measures to expedite trials and eliminate biases in the
administration of justice
Measures to stamp out corruption and impunity
Better use of the time during which offenders are deprived of
their liberty
Promotion of systems of alternative penalties not involving
deprivation of liberty
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Box 6
SANTAFE DE BOGOTA: POLICIES TO FOSTER IMPROVED SECURITY AND COEXISTENCE
Objective Actions to deal with violence and Measures to promote improved
promote improved coexistence coexistence
Strengthening of institutions Restructuring of Ministry of the Interior New integrated management of
Strengthening of the police security and social coexistence
Training of police officers A properly trained police force with
Bulletin giving statistics on violence adequate manpower
and delinquency Timely statistical information on
violence and delinquency made
available to the authorities and the
public at large, in order to evaluate
the measures taken
Establishment of mechanisms to Control of arms by the police Voluntary surrender of arms
prevent and reduce the number Suspension of permits to carry arms Campaigns to foster disarmament
of homicides Discouragement of liquor consumption Restriction on opening hours of night
Police controls clubs and bars and increase in
breathalyzer tests. “Hand over your
car keys” campaign
against drunken driving
Development of accident New traffic police Discouragement of liquor consumption
prevention mechanisms and increased use of breathalyzer tests
Restriction on opening hours of night
clubs and bars
“Hand over your car keys” campaign
against drunken driving
Restriction of use of gunpowder in
festivities
Use of safety helmet by motorcyclists
Development of alternative Conciliation centres Campaigns against violence
methods for settling conflicts Family Precincts Programme against child abuse
Police inspections Campaigns in favour of more courteous
attitudes
Greater community participation Police strategies to promote and support Security campaigns
in security community participation in security Security training
Improvement of the prison system Reconstruction and adaptation of the Improved processes for the social
district jail rehabilitation of prisoners
Design and implementation of Design of alternative models for the
training programmes punishment and social rehabilitation
Design of a new project for the of offenders
construction of a new jail
Source: Alcaldía Mayor de Santafé de Bogotá (1997).
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and Citizen Security which will seek to unify initia-
tives at the local and central level designed to fore-
stall and control factors which have been identified
as being related with crime and violence. The mea-
sures envisaged include the creation of data bases
and information systems, action to bring the judicial
services closer to the community, education for
peace and peaceful coexistence, the strengthening of
the National Police Force and its relations with the
community, programmes for young offenders, and
community participation programmes.
It is important to draw a distinction between
programmes in different countries of the region
which combine preventive and control measures, on
the one hand and, on the other hand, programmes
which do provide for combined action but give pref-
erence to repression and control measures.
An example of the latter type of programme is
the “Zero Tolerance” plan applied in New York,
which has been praised for significantly reducing
crime in that city. Based on the “broken window
theory” developed in 1982 as a result of the inves-
tigations of a group of United States criminalists,21
this Plan is based on the idea that every unpun-
ished offence, no matter how small it is, represents
an encouragement to commit more serious crimes,
because delinquents get the idea that they will not
be punished. In line with this approach, every kind
of offence is now pursued (as the name of the plan
implies), and police reforms have been made to in-
crease the number of policemen, expand the pow-
ers of the police to arrest suspects and make
searches, and apply a new approach to the fulfill-
ment of targets designed to prevent crime rather
than merely reacting to it. It is these measures
which have been given priority –at the expense of
social initiatives aimed at involving the commu-
nity and forestalling crime, such as increasing the
number of parks and sports facilities and establish-
ing special schools for the rehabilitation of juve-
nile delinquents– and which have given rise to
criticism on account of the police abuses they have
sometimes permitted.
Some multilateral organizations, assembling ex-
amples from inside and outside the region, have
identified forms of action which could be considered
more effective in dealing with violence. The World
Bank, for example, has made an evaluation of the
problem and proposed some effective measures for
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Box 7
WORLD BANK: PROPOSAL FOR A COMBINED APPROACH
Highly effective forms of Favourable macrosocial contexts Integrated approaches which could give
intervention enormous benefits
Epidemiological-type monitoring Abundant high-quality education Measures against impunity: increase the net
Control of sale and consumption of Equitable growth to reduce expected penalty
liquor and of mental ill-health poverty Strengthening of independent public control
Arms control (of the police force, the intelligence
Effective treatment of urgent cases services and the judiciary)
More flexible preventive and non-public
control measures
Beyond the schools: measures to strengthen
the fabric of society and social capital
Source: Londoño (1998).
21 This group, headed by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling,
made the following experiment: they left a car abandoned in a
sleazy neighbourhood to see what happened to it and how soon.
The days passed, but nobody went near it. Then they left a car
which had a broken window. In no time there was nothing left of
the vehicle.




As we have maintained throughout this article, vio-
lence and delinquency are multi-dimensional phe-
nomena and are closely associated with subjective
attitudes. Thus, efforts to explain them involve fac-
tors connected with the social and family position
and situation of the persons in question, social, eco-
nomic and cultural dimensions, and factors of a con-
textual and institutional nature.
One of the most obvious situations with regard
to criminal violence in Latin America is the striking
contrast between the growing sense of insecurity of
the population and the absence of consolidated statis-
tics which could give a more objective idea of the
true magnitude of the phenomenon. Although the
perception held by the population is undoubtedly an
important element, the lack of ongoing statistics
makes it difficult to prepare diagnoses that can serve
as an effective guide for the measures that need to be
taken by the public authorities, the private sector and
the population at large.
Bearing in mind this lack, this article aims to
make a contribution to the knowledge of the situation
of citizen insecurity affecting the region by making a
comparative analysis, on the basis of the limited and
not always reliable information available and from
different standpoints, both social and economic.
Our analysis has been centered on certain forms
of criminal violence in the 1990s, especially in the
cities, and is accompanied by a review of the most
important theories for the study of violence, the pro-
files of victims and aggressors, traditional and emer-
gent forms of delinquency, and the frequent relation
that exists between violence and unemployment. In-
formation has also been collected on the economic
cost of violence and delinquency and the different
policies adopted to deal with them.
We have emphasized the need to approach crim-
inal violence from an epidemiological standpoint
which takes account of the multidimensional nature
of the phenomenon, and we have also tried to iden-
tify the factors which do most to favour violence in
the countries of the region.
From this angle, we have examined the mea-
sures taken in the region in the field of citizen secu-
rity, in order to identify the main trends and the most
successful examples of action. It may be noted in this
respect that in Latin America, as well as in other
parts of the world, it has been becoming increasingly
clear that more integral approaches should be
adopted, combining prevention (both primary and
secondary) with control when dealing with criminal
violence.
The adoption of multidimensional programmes
raises great challenges. As well as dealing with the
most urgent needs, these programmes must also pur-
sue solutions sustainable in the long term which ef-
fectively reduce levels of violence. Furthermore, in
many cases it is also necessary to restore the confi-
dence of society at large in the police, as a prior step
to promoting community participation in and com-
mitment to citizen security plans; to set about judi-
cial and penal reform programmes, which call for
major political and social consensuses, and to pro-
mote a long-term cultural change involving a move
towards the peaceful settlement of conflicts in all the
different segments of society.
The challenge also includes the consolidation of
systems of crime statistics in the region in order to
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identify the most important factors affecting criminal violence and the more underhand and emergent
forms that it takes.
(Original: Spanish)
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